The Categorical Imperative

Understanding a key tenet of the Kantian philosophy

Few moral precepts parallel Immanuel Kant’s concept of the Categorical Imperative (CI), in terms of their influence on the modern notion of the person as an autonomous individual; worthy of dignity, respect and treatment as an equal. It underpins our legal and commonplace ideas of regarding all persons as bearers of fundamental and inalienable rights, which constitute the locus of contemporary democratic politics and citizenship.

CI forms the fulcrum of Kant’s moral doctrine set in the context of the 18th century German idealist tradition. It is premised on the essential capacity of all human beings, as rational persons with the autonomous exercise of free will. To Kant, the singular appeal of the motivation to duty is its sole preoccupation with respect for the moral law. The conception of CI is elaborated in three distinct propositions in three separate works; the Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals, the Critique of Practical Reason and The Metaphysics of Morals. All of them must necessarily be read in conjunction. The first posits that : “act only on that maxim through which you can at the same time will that it should become a universal law.” That is to say, if a person believes that he ought to act in a particular way, he must believe that another person would act in the same manner in a similar circumstance. Maxims are rules of conduct that free, rational and self-governing agents give themselves; their force derives from free-will, rather than from any external authority.

The second postulate of CI runs thus: “So act as to treat humanity, whether in thine own person or in that of another, in any case as an end withal, never as a means only.” There is a strong resonance of these formulations of CI in several ancient religious precepts. Kant recognised the similarities in his own conception and in the Golden Rule formulated by Jesus: “Do unto others as you would have them do unto you”.