A moment for just transition litigation to take wing Premium
The Hindu
The core issue in M.K. Ranjitsinh is the Bustard’s protection from the adverse impacts of solar and wind energy projects, which is an opportune moment to frame the issue using just transition
In April 2024, in M.K. Ranjitsinh and Others vs Union of India, the Supreme Court of India recognised a human right against the adverse impacts of climate change. The decision has attracted significant discourse, riddled with mixed reactions. For some, it has been a win for climate action. For others, it has failed to protect endangered biodiversity. Taking a relatively pragmatic position, in an earlier opinion page article in this daily, “The Great Indian Bustard and climate action verdict” (April 17, 2024), this writer mapped a course for the Court to adopt in its final decision — which is, framing the core issue in the case using the concept of just transition.
Since the final decision of the Court is due soon, this article delves deeper into the advantages of a just transition framing, arguing that first, it will facilitate equitable and inclusive climate action. Second, it will break new ground by introducing ‘Nature’ or the non-human environment as an entity in the concept of just transition. Third, it will bolster research on just transition litigation in India by foregrounding existing cases.
Just transition is not a new concept. However, its introduction to climate change is recent. Put simply, it aims to make mitigative climate action inclusive and fair. That is, it seeks to ensure that the burdens and benefits of decarbonisation are distributed equitably.
The concept emerged in the 1970s as a tool to protect workers whose jobs were being threatened by increasing environmental regulation. Later, it was brought into the debates on climate change by the international trade union movement. In that, a direct impact of decarbonisation was on workers employed in carbon-intensive economies. In 2015, it was included in the international treaty on climate change, the Paris Agreement.
A salient report by the United States-based Sabin Center for Climate Change Law notes that in addition to workers, just transition encompasses other persons in vulnerable situations. This includes indigenous communities, women, children, and minorities. Due to their pre-existing vulnerability, they are at a higher risk of being adversely affected by decarbonisation. Accordingly, thus far, the concept only includes affected human beings. Notably, despite its vulnerability to climate change, the non-human environment has not been recognised as a subject of just transition.
The core issue in M.K. Ranjitsinh is the protection of an endangered bird, the Great Indian Bustard, from the adverse impacts of solar and wind energy projects. This is an opportune moment for the Court to frame the issue using just transition and further its conceptual boundaries. Three advantages flow from taking this approach.
First, a just transition framing will allow the Court to facilitate equitable and inclusive climate action. A repeated critique of the judgment has been its framing of the core issue — the Court’s decision to juxtapose decarbonisation and biodiversity protection. Interestingly, it recognises that the two ‘do not exist in disjunctive silos’, and that one cannot be prioritised at the cost of the other. Yet, it proceeds to frame them as adversarial choices — pitching the conversation of the Great Indian Bustard against conservation of the ‘environment as a whole’ (through decarbonisation). Effectively, it presents biodiversity protection as a smaller public interest in comparison to the larger public interest of decarbonising the economy.